The standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings is different from that in a criminal trial.
In Suresh Pathrella v. Oriental Bank of Commerce (2006) 10 SCC 572, a two judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court differentiated between the standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings and criminal trials in the following terms:
“ …the yardstick and standard of proof in a criminal case is different from the disciplinary proceeding. While the standard of proof in a criminal case is a proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities.”
This standard wais reiterated by another two-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Samar Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P. 5 (2011) 9 SCC 94 :
“Acquittal in the criminal case shall have no bearing or relevance to the facts of the departmental proceedings as the standard of proof in both the cases are totally different. In a criminal case, the prosecution has to prove the criminal case beyond all reasonable doubt whereas in a departmental
proceedings, the department has to prove only preponderance of probabilities.”
In M. Siddiq v. Suresh Das (2020) 1 SCC 1, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court described the standard of ‘preponderance of probabilities’ as follows-
“720. The court in a civil trial applies a standard of proof governed by a preponderance of probabilities. This standard is also described sometimes as a balance of probability or the preponderance of the evidence. Phipson on Evidence formulates the standard succinctly: If therefore, the evidence is such that the court can say “we think it more probable than not”, the burden is discharged, but if the probabilities are equal, it is not. [Phipson on Evidence.] In Miller v. Minister of Pensions [Miller v. Minister of Pensions, (1947) 2 All ER 372], Lord Denning, J. (as the Master of Rolls then was) defined the doctrine of the balance or preponderance of probabilities in the following terms: (All ER p. 373 H) “(1) … It need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence, “of course it is possible, but not in the least probable” the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice.” (emphasis supplied) 721. The law recognises that within the standard of preponderance of probabilities, there could be different degrees of probability. This was succinctly summarised by Denning, L.J. in Bater v. Bater [Bater v. Bater, 1951 P 35 (CA)], where he formulated the principle thus: (p. 37) “… So also in civil cases, the case must be proved by a preponderance of probability, but there may be degrees of probability within that standard. The degree depends on the subject-matter.” (emphasis supplied)